Iran's Nuclear "Breakout" Capability

The following excerpts are from an article that originally appeared in an article entitled "How Corporate Media Are Fueling a New Nuclear Crisis," in the July 20, 2019 issue of The PeaceWorker.

National Public Radio chimed in with its own contribution to Iran's feared nuclear "breakout" narrative on July 10, 2019, by quoting John Negroponte, a former U.S Director of National Intelligence, who had declared: "Iran's newly announced levels [of uranium enrichment] appear modest at the moment, but would become more concerning if there were further increases. Such steps would imply a willingness on Iran's part to go all the way to construction of a bomb."

"The media narrative about Iran's resuming uranium enrichment thus suggests that what Americans should be worried about primarily is not the provocative character of the Trump administration's Iran policy but the threat that Iran will move toward a 'breakout' strategy vis-a-vis its nuclear weapons capability."

"The real history of Iran's enrichment strategy shows, however, that that nation was always aimed  at rolling back U.S. financial sanctions and compelling the United States to acknowledge legitimate Iranian interests in the region rather than to fuel a race for a bomb."

"Iran began enriching uranium to 20% in February 2010 for the first time to provide fuel plates for its Tehran Research Reactor, which produces isotopes for cancer treatment. But its overarching objective was to put pressure on the Obama administration, which was seeking to coerce Iran to give up its nuclear program altogether."

"In 2012, Iran began a new phase of diplomatic pressure on the Obama administration by making very large additions to its capability for enrichment at 20% while still avoiding converting these capabilities to a higher stockpile of uranium enrichment. Meanwhile, Iran's government signaled to the United States that it had the option of reversing the increase through an agreement."

Although Iran increased the number of centrifuges in the period between May and August 2012, none of the 1,440 centrifuges added were put into production, as the IAEA report showed.

"This all amounted to a clear signal to the Obama administration that Iran was ready to negotiate strict limits on its enrichment if the United States abandoned its zero-enrichment demand. 'They are creating tremendous capacity,' a senior U.S. official told The New York Times, 'but they are not using it.' The official acknowledged, moreover, that Iran's enrichment diplomacy gave it 'leverage' on U.S. policy."

"The widely accepted notion that Iran was prevented only by U.S. pressure from making a breakout bid for a nuclear weapon, and that Iran is now once again threatening to do so, is central to the present toxic political atmosphere surrounding the Iran nuclear issue."

"In fact, by mid-2012 Iran already had what was called a 'breakout' capability but chose to use it instead to induce the United States to negotiate seriously with Iran."